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INTRODUCTION
This Article explores the nexus of two stories central to contem-
porary American jurisprudence and—for tens of millions of citi-
zens—central to the American experience: the rise of the “carceral
state” through steep increases in the incarceration of non-whites,
and the decline, over the very same period, in legal protections for
prisoners.  The Article suggests that these two stories cannot be
considered in isolation from one another.  Nearly everything we
know about race from the social sciences suggests that, in the
highly pressured context of prison life, racial tensions will play a
role in the decisions that guards and administrators make concern-
ing prisoner welfare.  Social geography tells us concretely that the
communities from which non-white prisoners are drawn are the
ones least able to advocate for prisoner well-being.  And the sociol-
* Michael B. Mushlin, J.D., is a Professor of Law at Pace Law School; Naomi
Roslyn Galtz, J.D., Ph.D., is a Research Fellow for the Graduate Program in Real
Estate Law at Pace Law School.  The authors wish to thank Will Diaz, Class of 2009,
Pace Law School for his excellent research assistance; David McMillan of Fordham
Law School’s Urban Law Journal for his astute editing; and Caroline Hsu and the
students of Fordham Law School for convening a truly exciting symposium on condi-
tions of confinement.  We benefited greatly from discussion at that event.
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ogy of citizenship reveals that citizenship itself has always been
deeply “raced” in America, making it doubly challenging for a
largely non-white prison population to be seen as worthy of hu-
mane treatment.  Yet the law is not currently equipped to acknowl-
edge or confront the possibility that mistreatment of prisoners is
systemically bound to race-based tensions and structural inequities.
This is a critical gap that cannot, we argue, be remedied until the
courts adopt a more realistic understanding of the workings of race
in the corrections world.
A. Two Stories that Must Be Read Together
This Article arises at the intersection of two major American sto-
ries; the first is the rise of the “carceral state” and its disproportion-
ate toll on low-income communities of color.  Currently, one in
every hundred Americans1 (more than one in every fifty Ameri-
cans aged twenty to forty2) is behind bars, making America by far
the most heavily jailed nation in the developed world.3  The num-
bers are so striking that many in the prison research community no
longer speak of “rising incarceration rates” but rather discuss the
rise of the carceral state4—a state in which incarceration is a domi-
nant fact of economic policy and social life.5  The daily effects of
the carceral state, meanwhile, are felt disproportionately by low-
1. THE PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 100:  BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA 2008
5 (2008) [hereinafter THE PEW CTR.], available at  http://www.pewcenteronthestates.
org/uploadedFiles/8015PCTS_Prison08_FINAL_2-1-1_FORWEB.pdf.
2. Marie Gottschalk, Dismantling the Carceral State: The Future of Penal Policy
Reform, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1693, 1694 (2006) (citing Michael Tonry, Symbol, Substance,
and Severity in Western Penal Policies, 3 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 517, 518 (2001)).
3. For a sampling of articles that describe the United States as having the highest
incarceration rate in the developed world, see Robert Batey, The Costs of Judicial
Restraint:  Forgone Opportunities to Limit America’s Imprisonment Binge, 33 NEW
ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 29, 29 (2007); Gottschalk, supra note 2, at R
1694; Alice Ristroph, Criminal Law:  Desert, Democracy, and Sentencing Reform, 96
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1293, 1307 (2006).
4. See, e.g., Gottschalk, supra note 2, at 1695. R
5. Two provisos are in order here.  First, we do not engage the critique of the
“carceral state.”  For the purposes of this project, we simply take it as a given that
historically unprecedented numbers of Americans are in jail or prison.  Second, and
more importantly, we do not engage the question of whether the demographic skew
to blacks and Latinos in the prison system is itself a product of racial bias.  Assuming,
for argument’s sake, that the incarcerated population is a “fair” representation of the
criminal population, the same basic question arises:  what are the implications for
prisoner rights when disproportionate numbers of non-whites/non-Anglos are incar-
cerated while judicial safeguards for prisoner treatment decline?
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income communities of color.6  One in nine black men between the
ages of twenty and thirty-four is currently behind bars;7 at present
rates, one in three African American children born today can ex-
pect to enter the prison system at some point during his or her life.8
These statistics have enormous implications for urban black com-
munities, affecting “family life, adolescent development, labor
markets, family stability, intergenerational transfer of wealth, vot-
ing patterns, and civic participation.”9
The second story—one that mainstream jurisprudence treats as
wholly separate from the first—concerns the waning of prisoner
rights.  The 1970s witnessed vigorous efforts by civil rights lawyers
at prison reform, resulting in significantly improved conditions at
many jails and prisons.  But prisoner rights have been in steady
decline over the last twenty-five years, and the legal gains of the
1970s have been eclipsed by the rise of a judicial discourse in which
prisoners figure as a collective “management problem.”  The cur-
rent scope of deference to prison administrators and workers is
breathtaking; prisoner protections have become almost wholly de-
pendent on the claimed needs, capacities, and budgets of local
guards and prison officials (though these almost never need be
demonstrated).10   Although today’s prisons rarely resemble the
dungeons of the past, they are characterized by extreme over-
6. In this piece we concentrate on incarceration rates for African Americans,
hence the discussion of “race” rather than “race and ethnicity.”  But Latino communi-
ties have also disproportionately been impacted by skyrocketing incarceration rates,
as compared to white, Anglo communities. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PREVA-
LENCE OF IMPRISONMENT IN THE U.S. POPULATION, 1974-2001, at 1 (2003), available
at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/ascii/piusp01.txt (“The rate of ever having gone to
prison among adult black males (16.6%) was over twice as high as among adult His-
panic males (7.7%) and over 6 times as high as among adult white males (2.6%).”).
7. THE PEW CTR., supra note 1, at 6. R
8. Jeremy Travis, President, John Jay Coll. of Criminal Justice, New York City
Bar Asssociation 2008 Orison S. Marden Lecture:  Race, Crime and Justice:  A Fresh
Look at Old Questions 3 (Mar. 19, 2008), available at http://www.jjay.cuny.edu/extra/
speeches/racecrime_justice.pdf.
9. Id.
10. See, e.g., 1 MICHAEL B. MUSHLIN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS § 1:7 (3d ed., rev.
Oct. 2008), visit www.westlaw.com, search database “RGTSPRISON” (noting the Su-
preme Court’s “passion for deference” in this area); Eva S. Nilsen,  Decency, Dignity,
and Desert:  Restoring Ideals of Humane Punishment to Constitutional Discourse, 41
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 111, 144-45 (2007) (discussing the difficulty posed by modern
prisoner rights jurisprudence and concluding that Eighth Amendment claims are “ex-
tremely difficult to litigate because the Court has narrowed the basis for Eighth
Amendment claims using Estelle’s standard of deliberate indifference, making the
prisoner’s burden nearly impossible”).  Nilson further notes that:
Even inhumane prison conditions may be beyond the reach of the Eighth
Amendment unless it can be shown that the prison officials intentionally
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\36-1\FUJ102.txt unknown Seq: 4 28-JAN-09 13:03
30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXVI
crowding, shrinking educational and rehabilitative programs, and
the pervasive threat of violence.11  We are far from the promise of
the 1970s.
Despite the historical intersection between sharply rising incar-
ceration rates for non-whites and the contraction of prisoner rights,
very little work has been done to suggest why, or how, race matters
for the law that governs the treatment of prisoners.  There is, to be
sure, an extensive literature focusing on racial disparities in arrests
and sentencing.12  There is also a rich, emerging literature tracking
the effects of high incarceration rates on low-income communities
of color.13  But there is little sustained work that describes the im-
plications for prisoner rights law of America’s disproportionate in-
carceration of African Americans and Latino/as.
This Article represents an initial attempt to remedy the gap and
demonstrate why and how race matters for the jurisprudence of
prisoner rights.14  Part I offers an encapsulated historical account
of the rise and decline in protections available to prisoners.  In par-
ticular, it describes how a series of sharply divided Supreme Court
decisions, in tandem with the Prison Litigation Reform Act of
failed to remedy them after notice.  Thus, the official’s state of mind may be
more important to the Court’s analysis than the nature of the punishment.
Id.  See also The Supreme Court, 2005 Term: Leading Cases, 120 HARV. L. REV. 125,
263 (2006) (noting the Supreme Court’s “steady retreat” in protecting inmates’
rights).
11. See JOHN J. GIBBONS & NICHOLAS DE B. KATZENBACH, COMM’N ON SAFETY
& ABUSE IN AM. PRISONS, CONFRONTING CONFINEMENT (2006), http://www.prison
commission.org/pdfs/confronting_confinement.pdf (documenting overcrowding, de-
cline in prison rehabilitative programs, and increased violence in American prisons);
see also Francis A. Allen, The Decline of the Rehabilitative Ideal in American Criminal
Justice, 27 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 147, 148 (1978) (noting that prison programs have de-
clined); Carla I. Barrett, Does the Prison Rape Elimination Act Adequately Address
the Problems Posed by Prison Overcrowding?  If Not, What Will?, 39 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 391, 392 (2005).
12. See, e.g., THE SENTENCING PROJECT, REDUCING RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM:  A MANUAL FOR PRACTITIONERS AND POLICYMAKERS 3
(2000), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/Admin/Documents/publications/
rd_reducingrdmanual.pdf (describing racial disparities in other aspects of the criminal
justice system in America); Travis, supra note 8, at 3 (citing relevant studies). R
13. See, e.g., TODD CLEAR, IMPRISONING COMMUNITIES (2007); Margaret E.
Finzen, Systems of Oppression:  The Collateral Consequences of Incarceration and
Their Effects on Black Communities, 12 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 299 (2005);
Travis, supra note 8, at 3-10. R
14. This is the first piece to emerge from an ongoing project.  In further work, we
propose to engage more fully with the Equal Protection corpus, develop the citizen-
ship implications of the historical intersection described here, and provide a more
detailed picture of the extensively racialized nature of prison life and treatment within
prisons.
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199515 (“PLRA”), have acted radically to depress prisoner access
to the courts, thereby undoing some of the most significant judicial
gains of the 1970s.
Part II focuses on the judicial treatment of race in the prison
setting.  Under current prisoner rights law, courts will closely scru-
tinize the racial implications of prison policies and conditions only
where prison officials have explicitly based policies on racial con-
siderations or where plaintiffs can demonstrate an overt intent to
discriminate.  In this respect, prison decisions merely follow gen-
eral Equal Protection jurisprudence without reference to the
unique setting in which prisoner rights litigation arises.
As Part III suggests, however, the basic Equal Protection stan-
dards are misguided when applied to prison contexts.  Marshaling
evidence from the social sciences, Part III describes two fundamen-
tal ways that the courts must “get real” about race or risk complic-
ity in a legal system that allows and fosters systemic, racialized
forms of abuse.  First, a compelling body of research from psychol-
ogy and neuroscience indicates that, at a subconscious or “implicit”
level, decision-making may be deeply biased, even where there is
no overt attempt to discriminate.  Although courts cannot remedy
implicit bias, they can insist on heightened forms of process and
oversight to ensure that, in the uniquely pressured, power-laden,
and racialized context of prisons, biased decisions do not reign
unchecked.
Second, social geography demonstrates that prison populations
are disproportionately drawn from low-income communities of
color that are, in several respects, poorly positioned to advocate for
the rights of the incarcerated.  Such communities are, moreover,
reciprocally weakened by the processes of dislocation and re-ab-
sorption that attend mass incarceration in substandard prisons.
This should alert us to a significant risk that declines in prisoner
protections have been possible precisely because prisoners are
drawn disproportionately from communities that lack the resources
to provide vigorous oversight and advocacy.  In response, we urge
the federal courts to reverse their sweeping extension of deference
to prison administrators and re-assert their critical role as a bul-
wark against the erosion of rights for populations detached from
traditional levers of power.
15. The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321
(codifed as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., & 42
U.S.C.). Despite its name, PLRA was in fact signed into law in 1996.
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I. THE RISE AND DECLINE OF PRISONER RIGHTS
A. The Rise of Prisoner Rights
Until the civil rights era of the 1960s and 1970s, prisoners had no
articulable rights to humane conditions of confinement or access to
formal justice.  Initially the courts viewed prisoners as “slaves of
the state”16 and so refused to hear their complaints.  Later under
the “hands off doctrine” (which persisted well into the latter half of
the twentieth century) courts deemed themselves powerless to en-
force prisoners’ claims because of concerns over separation of pow-
ers, federalism, prison security, and judicial competence.17
The late 1960s and early 1970s witnessed dramatic new develop-
ments.  Spurred by the civil rights movement, a series of well-publi-
cized prison riots, and increased public concern for prisoner
welfare, lower courts began to take cognizance of prisoners’
claims.18  In 1974, the Supreme Court endorsed this emerging
trend, ruling in Wolff v. MacDonnell that “[t]here is no iron curtain
drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this country.”19
The Wolff decision, aided by the influx of lawyers to the field of
civil rights enforcement, unleashed litigation20 that helped, among
other things, to improve prison medical care, remedy horrendous
overcrowding, and increase professionalism in prison
administration.21
The period of openness to prisoner litigants was short-lived,
however.  Since 1980, prisoners’ access to the courts has steadily
contracted as a result of two developments.  First, a series of Su-
preme Court decisions has radically enlarged the scope of defer-
ence accorded to prison administrators and proscribed the
conditions under which poor treatment of prisoners—even objec-
tively brutal treatment—can be considered justiciable.  Second, the
16. See Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871).
17. See MUSHLIN, supra note 10, § 1.3. R
18. See id.
19. 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974).
20. This litigation led to the evolution of a new branch of law. See MUSHLIN,
supra note 10, § 1:4 (describing the importance of the entry of civil rights lawyers to R
the field of prisoner rights).
21. See Malcolm M. Feeley & Van Swearingen, The Prison Conditions Cases and
the Bureaucratization of American Corrections:  Influences, Impacts and Implications,
24 PACE L. REV. 433, 442-43 (2004); Vincent M. Nathan, Have the Courts Made a
Difference in the Quality of Prison Conditions?  What Have We Accomplished to
Date?, 24 PACE L. REV. 419, 420 (2004) (“Judicial intervention over the past three
decades has had an enormously positive impact on the operation of correctional insti-
tutions in the United States, and on the condition in which prisoners live and staff
work.”).
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Prison Litigation Reform Act of 199522 (“PLRA”) has erected a
host of new statutory barriers between any would-be prisoner
plaintiff and the courts.  Each of these developments is described
briefly below.
B. The Decline of Prisoner Rights
1. The United States Supreme Court Retreats
Through a series of sharply divided decisions over the last two
decades, the Supreme Court has forcefully limited the conditions
under which courts will recognize the violation of a prisoner’s
rights.  In Turner v. Safley, the Court held that even fundamental
rights can be abridged in a prison setting, as long as the deprivation
is reasonably related to some governmental objective.23  Utilizing
this test, the Court has had little difficulty upholding restrictions
that, in the free world, undeniably would amount to constitutional
violations.  For example, the Court has held under Turner that in-
mates can be medicated against their will,24 their publications cen-
sored,25 and family visits suspended for years at a stretch.26
A substantial line of rulings, moreover, specifically limits prison-
ers’ recourse to the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual
punishment. Whitley v. Albers established that, absent malicious-
ness, prison officials may use excessive force to subdue a prisoner
during a disturbance without running afoul of the Constitution.27
Indeed, under Albers, virtually any use of force by guards during a
prison disturbance may be sanctioned as long as the violence
“could plausibly have been thought necessary.”28
22. The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321,
1321-66 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C.,
& 42 U.S.C.).  As noted supra, note 15, the PLRA was actually signed into law in R
1996.
23. 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
24. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 227 (1990).
25. See Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 404 (1989).
26. See Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 137 (2003).
27. 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986).  Albers was shot in the knee as guards sought to quell
a cellblock uprising; he sustained serious permanent injury. Id. at 316-17.
28. Id. at 321 (emphasis added).  In this regard Justice O’Connor quoted the 1981
precedent Rhodes v. Chapman for the proposition that “a prison’s internal security is
. . . a matter normally left to the discretion of prison administrators.” Id. at 321.  The
Court might reasonably have concluded that heightened scrutiny would be useful in
the case of uprisings, where guards might well be tempted to take out their frustra-
tions.  Instead, quite the opposite, the Court concluded that deference to administra-
tors should be even greater than usual in such cases.  Id.
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In Wilson v. Seiter, the Court extended the logic of Albers to the
condition of confinement issues.29  Under the five-to-four Wilson
ruling, an inmate cannot make out a viable Eighth Amendment
claim merely by proving that conditions of confinement are—ob-
jectively speaking—unremittingly harsh and brutal.30  In addition
to demonstrating objectively inhumane conditions, a plaintiff must
prove that corrections officers were “deliberately indifferent” to
the suffering caused by the condition31 or that the officers were
“wanton” in their conduct.32  The Court was, moreover, explicit
that the definition of wantonness “depends upon the constraints
facing the official.”33 Wilson, in effect, reduced the cruel and unu-
sual standard to a function of administrators’ intentions and capa-
bilities; brutal conditions can be excused, no matter how far below
basic levels of human decency they fall.
Finally, in Sandin v. Conner, a closely divided Court found no
due process violation where an inmate was subjected to near-soli-
tary confinement for two months for an alleged disciplinary infrac-
tion—even though the prison had not afforded him even a
rudimentary hearing to determine if he had actually broken any
regulations.34  The Court in Sandin explained that only restrictions
that “impose[ ] atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life” constitute depriva-
tions of liberty which trigger due process protections.35  Under
Sandin, severe restrictions on an inmate’s living arrangements, in-
cluding transfers to isolation for periods of up to a year, have been
held to fall outside the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment
and thus may be imposed without any opportunity for the inmate
to challenge the basis for the punishment.36  These and similar
29. 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991).
30. See id.
31. Id. at 297-98.
32. Id.  As the concurrence notes, however, it is difficult to apply intent standards
to institutional conditions that stretch over long periods of time:
Inhumane prison conditions often are the result of cumulative actions and
inactions by numerous officials inside and outside a prison, sometimes over a
long period of time.  In those circumstances, it is far from clear whose intent
should be examined . . . .  In truth, intent simply is not very meaningful when
considering a challenge to an institution, such as a prison system.
Id. at 310 (White, J., concurring).
33. Id. at 303.
34. 515 U.S. 472 (1995).
35. Id. at 484.
36. See MUSHLIN, supra note 10, § 10.5. R
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cases reflect a general hostility toward prisoners’ claims to funda-
mental constitutional legal protection.37
2. The United States Congress Retrenches
The United States Congress further weakened prisoners’ access
to the courts by enacting the PLRA.  The PLRA, which was passed
by a voice vote and signed into law by President Clinton, erected a
number of barriers between inmates and the judiciary, with the ex-
press purpose of reducing prison litigation.  To begin with, the
PLRA bars any claim that does not involve a physical injury.38  A
“three strikes” provision prevents indigent prisoners from proceed-
ing in forma pauperis if they have sued and lost three times,39 ef-
fectively turning such prisoners into walking “rights-free zones.”
Since passage of the PLRA, an inmate must exhaust all available
remedies under the prison’s internal grievance system—regardless
of the system’s procedural complexity—before bringing suit.40  (If
the inmate blunders by, for example, missing a short grievance
deadline set by prison officials, the case is lost, no matter how mer-
itorious.41)  Other provisions restrict the scope of consent de-
crees,42 limit the relief available in prison overcrowding cases,43
and reduce the amount of attorneys’ fees that may be recovered
when prisoner plaintiffs prevail.44
Prisoner plaintiffs have challenged major provisions of the
PLRA, including the limits on consent decrees and exhaustion re-
quirements.  But save for one favorable interpretation at the mar-
gins, the Supreme Court has rejected all attempts to constrain the
effects of the PLRA.45
37. See id.
38. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (2006).
39. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (2006).
40. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2006).
41. See, e.g., Whitener v. Buss, No. 07-1490, 2008 WL 681814, at *1 (7th Cir. Mar.
13, 2008) (dismissing claim of prisoner who missed a forty-eight-hour grievance dead-
line because he needed the relevant officers’ names and it took a week to get them,
and he did not ask for waiver of the time limit); Wall v. Holt, No. 1:CV-06-0194, 2007
WL 89000, at *3-4 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 2007) (holding that a grievence was not timely
because the grievance appeal arrived a few days after the twenty-day deadline at the
Bureau of Prisons even though it was mailed within the time period permitted).
42. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(c)(1) (2006).
43. See id. § 3626(a)(3)(A)(i)-(ii) (2006); id. § 3626(a)(3)(C).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d) (2006).
45. See, e.g., Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (2006) (finding that administrative
remedies must be exhausted despite short deadline for filing); Porter v. Nussle, 534
U.S. 516 (2002) (finding exhaustion required both for cases involving assault and
those involving living conditions); Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327 (2000) (upholding
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C. Impact of Current Prisoner Rights Law
Given the retrenchment recounted above, it is fair to say that
today’s prison law does little to protect inmates from all but the
worst abuses.46  Not surprisingly, as the federal courts and Con-
gress continue to limit prisoner rights, conditions in American pris-
ons steadily deteriorate.  After a year-long investigation into the
nation’s prison system, the Commission on Safety and Abuse in
America’s Prisons concluded that American prisoners face an ex-
tremely high incidence of disease and illness and that most prisons
lack adequate health care services.  “Violence remains a serious
problem in America’s prisons and jails.”47  A majority of prisons,
according to the study, are plagued by overcrowding.48  Tens of
thousands of prisoners are locked in isolation cells for twenty-three
hours per day.49  As prison populations have grown, moreover,
prison programs such as Pell Grants for higher education (which
have been shown to correlate with reduced recidivism50) have de-
creased and, in some cases, disappeared entirely.51
constitutionality of the PLRA’s automatic stay provision); Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S.
731 (2001) (finding exhaustion required even where a grievance process does not au-
thorize the relief sought). But see Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007) (holding that
exhaustion is an affirmative defense and that there is no total exhaustion
requirement).
46. See Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions over Time:  A Case Study of Jail
and Prison Court Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550, 582-84 (2006) (noting the significant
reduction in the volume of court-ordered regulation due to the shift in correctional
injunctive practice).
47. GIBBONS & KATZENBACH, supra note 11, at 11. R
48. See id. at 27.
49. Id. at 52-53 (“On June 30, 2000, when the federal Bureau of Justice Statistics
last collected data from state and federal prisons, approximately 80,000 people were
reported to be confined in segregation units.  That is just a fraction of the state and
federal prisoners who spend weeks or months in expensive, high-security control units
over the course of a year, and it does not capture everyone incarcerated in supermax
prisons.”).
50. See Eric D. Blumenson & Eva S. Nilsen, How to Construct an Underclass, or
How the War on Drugs Became a War on Education, 6 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 61,
75-83 (2002).
51. See id. at 74 (describing the elimination of Pell Grants for prisoners); see also
GIBBONS & KATZENBACH, supra note 11, at 27 (“While the prison population grew
astronomically, funding for education, vocational training, and rehabilitative pro-
gramming did not keep pace.”); JAMES B. STEDMAN, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH RE-
PORT:  FEDERAL PELL GRANT PROGRAM OF THE HIGHER EDUCATION ACT:
BACKGROUND AND REAUTHORIZATION 25 (2003), available at http://digital.library.
unt.edu/govdocs/crs/permalink/meta-crs-8432:1 (describing cuts in the Pell Grant pro-
gram); BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 175 (2006)
(comparing the number of correctional and educational staff in American prisons
over time and finding that, while the prison population tripled from 1979 to 1995,
prison educational staff stayed the same, resulting in an over 60% cut in educational
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It is difficult to ignore that, over the very same years that pris-
oner rights have contracted and prison conditions have regressed,
prison populations have grown dramatically more black and
brown.  Yet under existing case law, it would be virtually impossi-
ble to challenge the racial implications of poor treatment of prison-
ers in, for example, one of the many rural prisons where virtually
all-white administrators and staff oversee virtually all non-white
prison populations.  In order to understand why such a challenge
would be impossible, we turn now to a closer examination of race’s
role in current prisoner rights case law.
II. RACE AND ETHNICITY UNDER CURRENT PRISON LAW
Under existing prisoner rights law, it is extremely difficult to ad-
vance a claim concerning racially-motivated mistreatment.  Courts
will apply strict scrutiny only when prison officials make decisions
based on explicit racial considerations—something officials rarely
do.  The Supreme Court affirmed this principle in Johnson v. Cali-
fornia,52 where it held that the California Department of Correc-
tions’ (“CDC”) explicit reliance on race as a factor in its housing
assignment protocol should trigger strict scrutiny review.53  Aban-
doning Turner’s looser “rational relationship” test54 (which the
Ninth Circuit had applied), the Court declared that California’s
policy of racial segregation must further a compelling governmen-
tal interest and be narrowly tailored to that interest.55
staff per inmate); Sam Dillon & Tamar Lewin, Pell Grants Said to Face a Shortfall of
$6 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2008, at A21; Greg Winter, Tens of Thousands Will
Lose College Aid, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2003, at A13 (stating that the
government’s new formula in determining financial aid “will reduce the nation’s larg-
est grant program [the Pell Grant program] by $270 million and bar 84,000 college
students from receiving any award at all”).
52. 543 U.S. 499 (2005).
53. The Court had sent similar signals in Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968),
where it affirmed the unconstitutionality of state statutes that required completely
segregated prisons and jails. Id. at 334.  Although some courts have interpreted Lee
to invoke a strict scrutiny analysis, there is no discussion of strict scrutiny in the short
per curiam opinion.
54. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 509.  California justified its practice of segregating newly
admitted inmates by race on security grounds, and it asked the Court to review this
practice under the less rigorous “rational relationship” test of Turner v. Safley.
55. In a dissent joined by Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas argued that the courts
should apply the Turner standard even in cases of explicit racial classification.  He
emphasized the need to defer to the judgment of corrections officials who are more
knowledgeable about security risks and experienced with the prison setting. Johnson,
543 U.S. at 529.  “[E]xperienced prison administrators, and not judges, are in the best
position to supervise the daily operations of prisons across this country.” Id.; see also
supra note 29.  Note, however, that strict scrutiny is not always “fatal in fact” in cases R
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The Johnson Court made its disdain for racial discrimination
clear, but the real legacy of Johnson was to impede rather than
ease plaintiffs’ access to the courts.  Absent a showing that admin-
istrators have expressly relied on race as a factor in formulating
policy, courts will refuse to delve into the racial implications of
prison practices.
Moreover, following general Equal Protection jurisprudence,56 a
prisoner plaintiff cannot prevail in a discrimination claim unless he
can demonstrate that the discrimination was intentional.  For ex-
ample, in Johnson v. Quander, plaintiffs challenged federal DNA
testing laws for federal prisoners as racially discriminatory because
the laws disproportionately impacted blacks, who are incarcerated
at higher rates than whites.57  The court held that a successful
Equal Protection claim requires more than a showing of dispropor-
tionate impact; plaintiffs also had to show that lawmakers enacted
the DNA testing law, which was facially neutral, with discrimina-
tory intent.58  Similarly, in Franklin v. District of Columbia,59 the
plaintiff claimed there was a disparity between programs for En-
glish-speaking inmates and those for Hispanic inmates with limited
language ability (Low English Proficiency or “LEP” inmates).
Even though the LEP programs were demonstrably less extensive
than those for English speakers, the court rejected the claim be-
involving prison security. The Ninth Circuit, in an unpublished opinion, held that it
was permissible for officials at California’s Pelican Bay prison to target Hispanic in-
mates for tighter security controls.  The overtly racial classification was justified, the
Ninth Circuit reasoned, by safety needs during a period of intense, racially-driven
unrest at the prison.  The court accepted defendants’ evidence to the effect that “His-
panics were, as a group, more likely to be violent than other groups and thus more
worthy of closer scrutiny.” Ramirez v. Reagan, No. 95-15048, 1996 WL 166203, at *5
(9th Cir. Apr. 9, 1996).
56. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-48 (1976); see also Charles R.
Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:  Reckoning with Unconscious
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 318 (1987); David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent
and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 935 (1989).
57. 370 F. Supp. 2d 79 (D.D.C. 2005), aff’d, 440 F.3d 489 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
58. See id.; see also Johnson v. Governor of Florida, 405 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2005)
(affirming summary judgment for defendant in a claim that Florida’s statutes barring
felons from voting violated both the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause
and section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973).  In Johnson, the plaintiff
claimed that the racist origins of Florida’s 1868 disenfranchising laws rendered them
unconstitutional, even after they were reenacted in 1968. See 405 F.3d at 1217.  The
Court rejected the Fourteenth Amendment claim on two bases:  (1) the reenacted
laws narrowed the class of disenfranchised individuals, thereby removing any discrim-
inatory taint; and (2) there was no allegation of racial discrimination at the time of the
reenactment. See id. at 1224-27.
59. 960 F. Supp. 394 (D.D.C. 1997).
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cause the plaintiff failed to show that the disparity resulted from
the defendant’s conscious discrimination.60
In 1992, prison guards placed a mentally ill inmate, who had
soiled himself, in a 125 degree bath and scrubbed him with wire
brushes until the flesh began to pull away from his legs in long
strips.61  The prisoner, Vaughn Dortch, was African American; his
jailers vowed to keep at the bath “until his skin turned white.”62
The Dortch incident was an uncommonly barbaric one.  But the
tenor and intensity of racial antagonism is familiar to anyone who
studies—or has worked or lived in—America’s prisons.63  Yet
under prevailing judicial norms, prisoners lack a mechanism to
seek redress where they find that racial antagonism systemically
pervades the treatment they receive or guides funding or policy
decisions.
Similar arguments could be made regarding judicial reluctance
to interfere with policies in schools or the workplace (for example,
inequitable funding schemes for schools, name-based racial profil-
ing in employment, etc.) that disadvantage non-whites yet manage
to fly beneath the Equal Protection radar.  We do not engage these
important issues.  We simply note that prison is not “school” or the
“workplace.”  The prison, rather, is an armored, “total institu-
tion”64 run exclusively by the state, whose raison d’eˆtre is to assert
control over inmates’ bodies and behaviors.  The prison is an
opaque container, separating inmates from outside sources of
60. See id. at 427-28.
61. SASHA ABRAMSKY, ILL-EQUIPPED:  U.S. PRISONS AND OFFENDERS WITH
MENTAL ILLNESS 85 (2003); Angela Davis & Cassandra Shaylor, A Question of Con-
trol, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 9, 2000, at SC-1, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/
article.cgi?file=/Chronicle/archive/2000/04/09/SC30299.DTL; see also Boiled Prisoner
Wins Case, http://sonic.net/~doretk/ArchiveARCHIVE/Prison/PRIS.TOPICS/Boiled
PrisonerWinsCase.html (last visited Dec. 16, 2008).
62. ABRAMSKY, supra note 61, at 85. R
63. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NO ESCAPE:  MALE RAPE IN U.S. PRISONS
ch. 2 (2001), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/prison/report2.html
(describing the intense atmosphere of racial hostility that pervades U.S. prison life);
Loı¨c Wacquant, Deadly Symbiosis, Rethinking Race and Imprisonment in Twenty-
First-Century America, BOSTON REV., Apr/May 2002, available at http://bostonre-
view.net/BR27.2/wacquant.html (describing the critical role of racial and ethnic alli-
ances in prison life; observing that cleavages between guards and prisoners as
categories have been replaced by a series of vertical alliances among prisoners/guards
of various races).
64. ERVING GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS:  ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL SITUATION OF
MENTAL PATIENTS AND OTHER INMATES 14-28 (1961).
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power, witnessing, and oversight.65  It is an overwhelmingly stress-
ful environment for guards, the ones most directly involved with
prisoners’ fates.66  And it is an institution that is already fiercely
and intrinsically raced, given the demographics of incarceration
and prison siting, the inflow of gang members, and the spread of
racist or racially charged ideologies within prison systems.
A basic and bitter irony emerges from a review of recent case
law at the intersection of race and prisoner rights: American courts
have been ready and willing to “crack down” on racial segregation
in prison housing67—an infrequent practice that may have demon-
strable benefits68; yet simultaneously, by endorsing the PLRA and
deepening judicial deference to prison administrators, the courts
have significantly curtailed civil rights protections available to a
population of two million, mainly non-white individuals currently
incarcerated in the United States.  As a net result, non-whites typi-
cally cannot be housed separately from whites in American prisons
today.  But they can be subjected to egregiously bad treatment69
65. See, e.g., GIBBONS & KATZENBACH, supra note 11, at 77-78 (pointing out that R
prisons are closed institutions and that oversight of them is “underdeveloped and
uneven”).
66. See, e.g., TED CONOVER, NEWJACK GUARDING SING SING 80-83 (2000)
(describing vividly the stress that prison guards experience).
67. See MUSHLIN, supra note 10, § 4.4.  In this Article, I observed that: R
In the 1968 case of Lee v Washington, the Supreme Court dealt with whether
it was constitutional for a state to maintain an explicit policy of racially seg-
regating its prisons . . . .  The state maintained that segregation was needed
to prevent racial violence from flaring up in its prisons.  The Court’s opinion
in the case consisted of a short, three-sentence paragraph summarily af-
firming the district court’s order that de jure prison segregation was uncon-
stitutional.  [The decision was subsequently reinforced by] a majority of the
Supreme Court in dictum in Cruz v. Beto . . . .
. . . .
Lower courts implementing this mandate have [likewise] struck down segre-
gation . . . that came about because prison officials permitted inmates free
choice as to where they would be housed. . . . In Jones v. Diamond, a jail
permitted inmates to choose which of the two “bullpens” they would be
placed in.  When the cells became racially segregated, the defendants
claimed that this was only the result of the “free choices” of the inmates. . . .
And in Johnson v. State of California the Ninth Circuit made clear that a
policy of racial discrimination of housing assignments, if proven, would not
be tolerated.  Thus, prisons are under a mandate to create the “maximum
feasible integration” within prison walls.
Id. (citations omitted, emphasis added); see also supra notes 53-65 and accompanying R
text.
68. In many of the cases prison authorities were apparently attempting, in part, to
defuse violence by allowing for racially separate housing. See MUSHLIN, supra note
10, § 4.4. R
69. See supra notes 24-37 and accompanying text. R
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within prisons that often feature primarily white administrators
and guards70 with no judicial checks on the relationship between
systemic racism and prison conditions.  Rectifying this situation
means, first and foremost, getting real about how race matters in
the prison system.
III. HOW RACE MATTERS: LESSONS FROM THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES
A. Subconscious Racism
Research from the social sciences suggests that racial discrimina-
tion transpires at a subconscious level.71  In the prison context, this
raises troubling questions concerning jailors’ treatment of prison-
70. Loı¨c Wacquant, Deadly Symbiosis:  When Ghetto and Prison Meet and Mesh, 3
PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 95, 115 (2001), available at http://pun.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/
3/1/95.  Wacquant notes that:
[A]t century’s end, the convicts of New York City, Philadelphia, Baltimore,
Cleveland, Detroit, and Chicago, who are overwhelmingly African Ameri-
can, serve their sentences in establishments staffed by officers who are over-
whelmingly white. In Illinois, for instance, two-thirds of the state’s 41,000
inmates are blacks who live under the watch of an 8,400-member uniformed
force that is 84% white.  In Michigan and Pennsylvania, 55% of prisoners
are black but only 13% and 8% of guards, respectively, come from the Afro-
American community.  In Maryland, the correctional staff is 90% white and
monitors an inmate population that is 80% black.  With the proliferation of
detention facilities in rural areas, the economic stability and social welfare of
lower-class whites from the declining hinterland has come to hinge, per-
versely, on the continued socioeconomic marginality and penal restraint of
ever-larger numbers of lower-class blacks from the urban core.
Id.
71. Here we offer a critical proviso.  In this Article we focus on a body of psycho-
logical research that suggests racist stereotypes help to structure our perceptions and
thus influence decision-making even when we do not mean to be racist.  We focus on
the clinical body of work because we believe courts should find it hard to ignore:
results are consistent, often repeated, and appear to have a good basis in neuros-
cience.  However, there is a danger in concentrating on psychological research only
and not attending to the larger cultural and ideological formations that structure and
support racial perceptions.  As Charles Lawrence (a seminal scholar of Critical Race
Theory who is largely responsible for introducing the notion of implicit bias to the
law) has noted:
[I] fear that cognitive psychology’s focus on the workings of the individual
mind may cause us to think of racism as a private concern, as if our private
implicit biases do not implicate collective responsibility for racial subordina-
tion and the continued vitality of the ideology and material structures of
white supremacy. In its most extreme manifestation, this view of implicit
bias, as evidence only of private, individual beliefs, is expressed as a right to
be racist.
Charles Lawrence III, Unconscious Racism Revisited: Reflections on the Impact and
Origins of “The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection”, 40 CONN. L. REV. 931, 942
(2008).
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\36-1\FUJ102.txt unknown Seq: 16 28-JAN-09 13:03
42 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXVI
ers, the ability of non-white inmates to air grievances, and the
courts’ ability to detect decisions perniciously influenced by race.
The recent wave of research documenting the subconscious op-
erations of race emerged in the 1990s.72  For decades, social psy-
chologists plumbing the relationship between attitudes and
behavior found it difficult to demonstrate how, how often, or under
what circumstances expressed attitudes actually predict behavior.73
In a 1990 article, Anthony Greenwald suggested that social psy-
chologists had been looking for connections between attitude and
behavior in all the wrong places.  Researchers typically sought ex-
plicit, direct connections, yet a review of existing work suggested
that attitudes most clearly emerge to shape behavior when subjects
are focusing on something other than attitudes.74
This is the basic insight behind the development of the Implicit
Association Test (“IAT”) by Mahzarin Banaji, Anthony Green-
wald, and Brian Nosek.  The IAT—which now comprises a battery
of assessment tools concerning race, gender, age, religion, and
other social categories—has become a potent force in the scholar-
ship of bias, spawning over two hundred studies in some of the
most respected research institutions across the United States and
abroad.75  The IAT provides dramatic evidence that individuals
72. This was not the first wave of social science research to concentrate on subcon-
scious or implicit sources of racial stereotyping and discrimination. See, e.g., Law-
rence, supra note 71, at n.76. R
73. See, e.g., Anthony G. Greenwald, What Cognitive Representations Underlie So-
cial Attitudes?, 28 BULL. OF THE PSYCHONOMIC SOC’Y 254, 254-56 (1990).
74. See id. at 255.  So, for instance, in one experiment, study participants were
asked to review essays and rank them.  See id. at 256.  Each essay was presented in a
folder containing a photo of the “author.”  Unbeknownst to the participants, the re-
searchers systematically varied the pairing of essays and photos.  One set of folders
contained the photo of a typically attractive woman; a second set, a typically unattrac-
tive woman; control folders contained no photos at all.  In one variation of the experi-
ment, “attractive” authors scored nearly twice as high as “unattractive” ones on the
basis of identical essays (5.2 versus 2.7 on a scale of 1 to 9). Id.  For Greenwald’s
purposes, what makes this study important is that the study participants were not
thinking about gender or attractiveness; they were concentrating on reading and scor-
ing essays.  Greenwald describes, moreover, a host of studies like this, in which atti-
tudes emerge as strong determinants of outcome precisely when participants are not
attending to them.
75. Shankar Vedantam, See No Bias, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2005, at W12, available
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A27067-2005Jan21.html.  The IAT
has evolved into something of a cottage industry.  See Brian A. Nosek et al., Harvest-
ing Implicit Group Attitudes and Beliefs from a Demonstration Web Site, 6 GROUP
DYNAMICS:  THEORY, RES. & PRAC. 101 (2002); see also generally IAT Corp., Project
Implicit, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/demo/ (last visited Dec. 16, 2008) (al-
lowing visitors to take brief IATs, receive feedback, and have their results compiled
into an ongoing web poll).
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find it hard to control implicit associations between, for example,
“white” and “good.”76
The IAT asks test-takers to complete pairings in a rapid manner,
with little time to think.  For instance, test-takers are asked to de-
termine whether drawings of faces and photos of famous places
belong with the grouping “Asian American face or foreign place”
or “European American face or U.S. place.”  They are then asked
to repeat the exercise with the groupings reversed (“Asian Ameri-
can face or U.S. place” versus “European American face or foreign
place”).77  Reasoning that “[t]he more closely associated the two
concepts are, the easier it is to respond to them as a single unit,”78
IAT researchers use the relative speeds and success rates with
which individuals complete sorting tasks to measure “implicit
bias,” a form of bias that may operate most strongly when individu-
als are operating quickly and instinctively or are concentrating on
something other than the relevant category (age, race, gender,
etc.).
IAT studies have consistently “demonstrated a strong and auto-
matic positive evaluation of white Americans and a relatively nega-
tive evaluation of African Americans.”79  Across tens of thousands
of tests, “88 percent of white people [demonstrated] a pro-white or
anti-black implicit bias . . . and more than two-thirds of non-Arab,
non-Muslim volunteers displayed implicit biases against Arab Mus-
lims.”80  Nor are non-whites immune to implicit racial bias: “some
48 percent of blacks showed a pro-white or anti-black bias [and] 36
percent of Arab Muslims showed an anti-Muslim bias.”81  Implicit
bias, moreover, appears hard to control.  At least one follow up
76. See Vedantam, supra note 75. R
77. To minimize the influence of order on selection, test administrators vary the
order in which test takers encounter the categorization tasks. See IAT Corp., supra
note 75. R
78. See Online Psychology Laboratory:  Implicit Association Test (Race), http://
opl.apa.org/Experiments/About/AboutIATRace.aspx (last visited Dec. 16, 2008).
79. Nilanjana Dasgupta et al., Automatic Preference for White Americans:  Elimi-
nating the Familiarity Explanation, 36 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 316 (2000);
see also Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias:  Scientific
Foundations, 94 CAL. L. REV. 945, 955-56 (2006); Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Mea-
suring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition:  The Implicit Association Test, 74 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1464 (1998).
80. Vedantam, supra note 75.  Large majorities of test-takers similarly showed R
preferences for Christians over Jews and for rich people over poor.
81. Id.
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study found that participants were unable to suppress the tendency
to appear pro-white on the black/white IAT.82
Increasingly, research suggests that implicit racial bias informs
an individual’s ongoing flow of perceptions and judgments, includ-
ing perceptions of danger and anger.  For instance, as one of a se-
ries of studies, Joshua Correll asked white participants to “play a
primitive video game in which they had to make split-second
“shoot/no-shoot” decisions based on whether the figure on the
screen was holding a gun.”83  Correll found that most subjects
“were more trigger-happy when presented with an image of a black
man.”84  Similarly, according to studies by Kurt Hugenberg and
Galen V. Bodenhausen, when presented with a series of racially
ambiguous faces, individuals who rank high in implicit bias as mea-
sured by the IAT are much more likely to categorize angry or men-
acing faces as black.85
Neuroscience appears to ratify these findings.  In one study,
Mahzarin Banaji (who helped create the IAT) worked with neuros-
cientist Elizabeth Phelps to explore how the IAT correlates to
82. See Do-Yeong Kim, Voluntary Controllability of the Implicit Association Test
(IAT), 66 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 83 (2003).  Additionally, recent research tends to disaf-
firm the “familiarity explanation,” the idea that test subjects pair “white” and “good”
more quickly merely because they are more familiar with Caucasian faces. See Das-
gupta et al., supra note 79. R
83. Drake Bennett, Black Man vs. White Woman, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 17, 2008,
at D1, available at http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2008/02/17/black
_man_vs_white_woman/.
84. Id.  But note that Correll contends that “these biases can be sharply reduced,
and in some cases even erased.  When participants, for example, are shown images of
well-liked black public figures before taking the IAT, their anti-black biases disap-
pear.” Id.
85. See Kurt Hugenberg & Galen V. Bodenhausen, Ambiguity in Social Categori-
zation:  The Role of Prejudice and Facial Affect in Race Categorization, 15 PSYCHOL.
SCI. 342, 342-44 (2004).  There seemed to be little difference in categorizations of
happy faces. Id. at 345.  For citations to similar work, see Vedantam, supra note 75, R
who reported that:
A study in Germany by psychologist Arnd Florack found that volunteers
whose results suggested more bias against Turks—an immigrant group—
were more likely to find a Turkish suspect guilty when asked to make a judg-
ment about criminality in an ambiguous situation.  In another study by psy-
chologist Robert W. Livingston at the University of Wisconsin . . . volunteers
were given details of a crime in which a Milwaukee woman had been as-
saulted, suffered a concussion and required several stitches.  In this case . . .
some volunteers were told the perpetrator had been proven to be David
Edmonds from Canada.  Others were told the guilty perpetrator was Juan
Luis Martinez from Mexico.  Volunteers were asked what length of sentence
was appropriate for the crime:  bias scores against Hispanics on the implicit
tests tended to predict a longer sentence for the Mexican.
Id.
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brain activity.86  Sophisticated, rapid functional magnetic
resonance imaging (“fMRI”) revealed that the IAT (but not ex-
press attitudes) was a good predictor of the amount of activity in
the amygdala (popularly referred to as the “fear center” of the
brain) when white test subjects were shown pictures of black
faces.87  “Black,” that is to say, appears to be highly correlated with
both “dangerous” and “angry” at an implicit level,88 and “[i]f ste-
reotypes color something as basic as face perception, then the
downstream consequences may be considerable. . . . Perceived hos-
tility will at best promote avoidance—or worse, may foster
reciprocation.”89
The robust findings on subconscious systems of racial bias have
obvious implications for prisons, where guards must make split-sec-
ond determinations concerning threats, in an atmosphere struc-
tured around the need to dominate.90  Prison medical workers
similarly must make rapid decisions concerning which prisoners
truly need care and who might be “scheming” or “faking,” all in a
pressured and typically under-resourced situation.  Post facto it
could be impossible to disentangle the role of implicit bias (or even
explicit bias) in decisions concerning punishment, health care,
mental health care, etc., but in a prison setting such decisions can
have life or death consequences.  The problem is only compounded
by the fact that differences in norms and communication styles can
make it difficult to press grievances cross-culturally.91  Hence, race
86. See generally Elizabeth A. Phelps et al., Performance on Indirect Measures of
Race Evaluation Predicts Amygdala Activation, 12 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 729
(2000), available at http://faculty.psy.ohio-state.edu/cunningham/pdf/phelps.jocn.2000.
pdf.
87. See id. at 734.
88. See, e.g., Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, supra note 85, at 343-45; Vedantam, R
supra note 75. R
89. Subconscious Bias Skews Perceptions, NW. NEWS, Mar. 2, 2004,  http://www.
northwestern.edu/univ-relations/media_relations/releases/2004_03/bias.html.
90. See, e.g., Philip G. Zimbardo et al., The Psychology of Imprisonment:  Priva-
tion, Power and Pathology, in DOING UNTO OTHERS:  EXPLORATIONS IN SOCIAL BE-
HAVIOR 61-73 (Z. Rubin ed. 1974); Philip G. Zimbardo, Pathology of Imprisonment, 6
SOC’Y 4 (1972); see also Lorna G. Rhodes, Supermax as a Technology of Imprison-
ment, 74 SOC. RES. 547, 553-57 (2007).
91. A long-standing body of research indicates that blacks and whites have sub-
stantially different styles of interaction; in school settings, for instance, there is re-
search indicating that different interactional styles, coupled with differing
expectations of treatment and fairness, can make it difficult for black parents to ad-
vance their concerns with the same ease as white parents. See, e.g., Audrey Devine-
Eller, Rethinking Bourdieu on Race:  A Critical Review of Cultural Capital and Hab-
itus in the Sociology of Education Qualitative Literature 5-6 (May 2, 2005) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with author at http://www.eden.rutgers.edu/~auderey/
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likely is implicated even in the incomplete forms of due process
and prison oversight/witnessing (e.g., letters and complaints from
family) that do exist.
Courts cannot, of course, seek to control the minds of guards and
prison administrators.  But they can ensure that heightened forms
of oversight, monitoring, and internal due process are used to reign
in the influence of bias, even where bias cannot be proved.  Unfor-
tunately, as discussed in Parts II and III above, the courts have
moved in the opposite direction, offering ever greater deference to
prison officials and accepting minimal forms of internal due
process.
B. Race, Class, and Geography
A number of studies have explored the links among class, neigh-
borhood, and incarceration rates, but few address these links in the
context of prisoner rights.  The fact that sending communities are
overwhelmingly low-income, poor, and disproportionately en-
meshed with the criminal justice system means that communities
with the largest stake in the prison system are poorly positioned to
advocate for prisoner rights.  Employing Geographical Information
Systems (“GIS”), researcher Eric Cadora demonstrated this point
in a powerfully simple way: Cadora used mapping software to plot
the home addresses of incarcerated individuals from Brooklyn,
New York, using color coding to indicate varying concentrations of
residents in prison.92  Deep red on the Cadora map indicates so-
called “million dollar” blocks—blocks for which the annual costs of
incarceration amount to $1,000,000 or more—with progressively
lighter shades indicating less entanglement with the prison sys-
tem.93  Cadora published this map alongside one that shows con-
centrations of African American residents.94  The two maps fit like
hand in glove: concentrations of incarcerated individuals follow the
contours of concentrations of African American residents with ac-
robatic finesse, looping in and out of the poorest neighborhoods of
Brooklyn.
The Cadora maps help to crystallize a basic insight that social
researchers and advocates have been trying to tell us for over a
papers.htm, follow “Rethinking Bourdieu” hyperlink).  As far as the authors of this
Article are aware, no parallel research has been conducted in a prison setting.
92. See, e.g., Gothamist:  Where Do Prisoners Come from?, http://gothamist.com/
2005/11/27/where_do_prison.php (last visited Dec. 16, 2008).
93. Id.  At current rates, it takes approximately thirty incarcerated individuals to
form a million dollar block.
94. Id.
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decade: whatever the precise mix of reasons—and the reasons are
manifold—low-income communities of color have been utterly,
disproportionately impacted by skyrocketing incarceration rates.95
There is no longer any basis to doubt the existence of a well devel-
oped circuit between prisons and low-income communities of
color.
An important clarification is in order here: we by no means con-
tend that courts are responsible for “balancing out” the composi-
tion of sending communities, or that individuals are less culpable
for law breaking because they are from impoverished communities.
Rather, this Article merely highlights two points: (1) the concentra-
tion of blacks in low-income communities is an integral part of the
American story of race and cannot be dismissed as the product of
“mere” market choices,96 and (2) the circuit between prisons and
low-income communities of color is in many senses a closed one.
Although race and class are often viewed as separate variables,
much empirical evidence—particularly research incorporating a
spatial dimension—reveals deep interrelationships between class
and race.  William Julius Wilson, for instance, has documented how
racial inequalities gave rise to spatially-bound forms of class subor-
dination;97 how the “suburbanization of work” (driven by racist
ideologies and policies) stranded working-class blacks in inner city
ghettoes,98 halting upward mobility for African Americans just as
95. See id; see also supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text (describing Equal R
Protection cases).
96. In the traditional Equal Protection discourse, the geographic concentration of
racial and ethnic minorities is the product of sheer market forces and therefore some-
how beyond justiciable issues of racial equity. See, e.g., Austin Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
United States, 429 U.S. 990, 994 (1976) (“Economic pressures and voluntary prefer-
ences are the primary determinants of residential patterns.”).  In this discourse, more-
over, race and class are conceptualized as cleanly separable variables.
97. See WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS:  THE WORLD OF
THE NEW URBAN POOR 3-50 (1996) [hereinafter WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS];
WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE:  BLACKS AND
CHANGING AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS 42-121 (2d ed. 1980).  The authors acknowledge
the storm of controversy that attended Wilson’s claim of a “declining” significance to
race “as opposed to” class.  Here we merely draw on Wilson’s work to illustrate that
racial, class, and spatial formations are tightly enmeshed in American life.
98. Researcher Bruce Katz similarly notes:
In 1970, only 25% of the nation’s offices were located in suburbs.  More
recent numbers indicate that over 60% are now located in the suburbs.
Many city residents have not been able to follow this migration of jobs.  The
lack of transportation choices in metropolitan areas limits options for those
without cars and it prevents central city residents from accessing jobs located
in the suburbs.
BRUCE KATZ & KATHERINE ALLEN, HELP WANTED:  CONNECTING INNER-CITY JOB
SEEKERS WITH SUBURBAN JOBS 32 (1999), available at http://www.brookings.edu/
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civil rights protections were being enacted;99 and how continuing
racial tensions and prejudices work to maintain racial segregation
by neighborhood.100  As sociologist Loı¨c Wacquant reports, the
concentration of black urban poverty has only increased in recent
years (at least in Chicago, where he used both statistical and ethno-
graphic methods to investigate the historically black inner-city
community of Bronzeville):
[I]n Chicago the proportion of all poor blacks residing in ex-
treme-poverty areas (i.e., census tracts containing more than 40
per cent of persons living in households below the official pov-
erty line) shot up from 24 per cent to 47 per cent between 1970
and 1980.  By this date, fully 38 per cent of all poor African
Americans in the country’s ten largest cities lived in extreme-
poverty tracts, compared to 22 per cent a decade earlier and
only 6 per cent among poor non Hispanic whites.101
As Wacquant documents, the growing spatial concentration of
extreme poverty has produced an “unprecedented mesh of obsta-
cles”102 for urban blacks, including lack of proximity to jobs, defi-
cient housing, and under-resourced schools.”103  Wacquant
describes these obstacles in order to elucidate a “closed opportu-
nity structure”104 that helps to explain entry to crime.  Far more to
the point for our purposes is how such obstacles close communities
off from sources of political influence and advocacy.  Low-income
communities of color are terra incognita for much of middle-class
America—they are even the subject of ethnography, as venture-
some scholars attempt to map this part of America for the
“mainstream.”105
press/review/fall99/bkatz.pdf.  Moreover, new jobs created in the city are often geared
to the “new class” of creative workers—jobs for which low-income urban citizens are
typically not well prepared. Id.
99. WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS, supra note 97, at 3-50. R
100. See generally WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON & RICHARD P. TAUB, THERE GOES
THE NEIGHBORHOOD:  RACIAL, ETHNIC, AND CLASS TENSIONS IN FOUR CHICAGO
NEIGHBORHOODS AND THEIR MEANING FOR AMERICA (2007) (documenting, largely
through ethnographic and qualitative approaches, the resistance of neighborhoods to
changing ethnic compositions and the ways that positive forces of community stability
can hamper mobility and integration).
101. LOI¨C WACQUANT, URBAN OUTCASTS:  A COMPARATIVE SOCIOLOGY OF AD-
VANCED MARGINALITY 94 (2007).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 94-95.
104. Id.
105. Wacquant’s work, supra note 101, is one example; another is SUDHIR ALLADI R
VENKATESH, OFF THE BOOKS: THE UNDERGROUND ECONOMY OF THE URBAN POOR
(2006).  Xavier University actually offers a sort of “study abroad” program to Over-
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As a result of the spatial concentration of black urban poverty,
ghetto residents, even those with stable jobs who are upwardly as-
piring, often become dependent upon economic circuits outside the
mainstream, in community-based shadow economies,106 marking
the further distancing of inner-city African American populations
from mainstream sources of power and influence.  Indeed, the
pocketing up of African American poverty has allowed it to be
cordoned off from the daily experience not only of whites, but of
middle-class and elite black Americans—as reflected, for instance,
in the “confessions” of Henry Louis Gates, Jr., concerning his feel-
ings of extreme estrangement from black inner-city teens,107 or the
recent critiques of poor blacks by Bill Cosby, Jr.108  The point for
our discussion is not whether the opprobrium is useful or righteous,
but rather the fact that it exists at all, marking distance from an
important source of support and advocacy (the African American
middle class).
The distance is only exacerbated, of course, by the prison system
itself, which removes populations of inner-city non-whites from
sight in a way that rationalizes the removal.  As Eduardo Bonillo-
Silva has noted:
[B]ecause the enforcement of the racial order from the 1960’s
onward has been institutionalized, individual whites can express
a detachment from the racialized way in which social control
agencies operate in the United States.  Because these agencies
are legally charged with maintaining order in society, their ac-
tions are deemed neutral and necessary.109
Meanwhile, communities that are already short on resources,
and removed from mainstream sources of power, are further un-
dermined politically and economically by the prison system and re-
lated civil disabilities, including the loss of census credits (and
the-Rhine, the community that was the site of the 2001 riots. See Newsletter, Urban
Academic Service Learning Semester (Oct. 4, 2007) , http://www.xavier.edu/service_
learning/newsletters/Urban%20Service%20Learning%20Newsletter1.pdf (“Unlike
the international programs, we have the distinction of not only residing in the United
States, but importantly, within the city of our university.”).
106. VENKATESH, supra note 105, at 1-90. R
107. Frontline:  The Two Nations of Black America (PBS television broadcast Feb.
10, 1998) (transcript on file with author), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/shows/race/etc/script.html.
108. Manny Fernandez, Cosby Defends Criticism of Black Community, WASH.
POST, Sept. 9, 2004, at B3, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/arti-
cles/A6615-2004Sep8.html.
109. EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, WHITE SUPREMACY AND RACISM IN THE POST-
CIVIL RIGHTS ERA 111 (2001).
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attendant funding) for inmate populations which are ascribed to
the communities where prisons sit.  Specific impacts include:
1. Increased risk of disease in communities (demonstrably at-
tributable to the social instability caused by incarceration,
coupled with poor prison health care and the prevalence of
STDs in prisons);110
2. Diminishment of earning capacity (high incarceration of low
educational attainment populations, coupled with withdrawal
of educational options for prisoners, all compounded by ex-
treme social reluctance to hire black ex-convicts);111
3. Destabilization of families as prisoners are relocated far from
home communities with no rights of appeal;112
4. Civil disabilities, including lack of access to some government
social services for families that merely reside with an ex-con-
vict;113 and
5. Removal of populations for census purposes, as prisoners are
counted as being “in residence” in the communities to which
they are sent; this affects everything from congressional ap-
portionments to government grants for urban renewal.114
The circuit between prison and ghetto115 is so well cordoned off
from public view that the magnitude of the problem does not seem
to touch mainstream America, making it possible for one in every
fifty Americans aged twenty to forty to be in prison, without pro-
110. James C. Thomas & Elizabeth Torrone, Incarceration as Forced Migration:  Ef-
fects on Selected Community Health Outcomes, 96 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1762, 1762-65
(2006) (estimating the effect of incarceration on teenage pregnancies and sexually
transmitted infections and finding that population disruptions owing to incarceration
demonstrably lower community health outcomes).
111. DEVAH PAGER ET AL., RACE AT WORK:  A FIELD EXPERIMENT OF DISCRIMI-
NATION IN LOW-WAGE LABOR MARKETS 40 (2008), available at http://www.law.vir-
ginia.edu/pdf/workshops/0708/pager.pdf.
112. See, e.g., CLEAR, supra note 13, at 95-96 (“[A] long and rich literature shows R
that removal of a parent from the home has, on the average, negative consequences
for the partner and the children who remain.”).
113. Finzen, supra note 13, at 309-17. R
114. See, e.g., Taren Stinebrickner-Kauffman, The Prison Effect on Political Land-
scape, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 17, 2004, available at http://www.csmonitor.
com/2004/0517/p09s02-coop.html.
115. Scholars such as Loı¨c Wacquant (as well as many activists) view prison as an
outright form of racial control.  “We will indeed see . . . that the massive and rapidly
growing over-representation of African Americans at all levels of the penal system
expresses the new role that the latter has assumed in the panoply of instruments of
racial domination since the ghetto uprisings of the 1960s.”  Loı¨c Wacquant, The Great
Penal Leap Backward:  Incarceration in America from Nixon to Clinton, in THE NEW
PUNITIVENESS:  CURRENT TRENDS, THEORIES, PERSPECTIVES 7 (John Pratt et al. eds.,
2005), available at http://sociology.berkeley.edu/faculty/wacquant/wacquant_pdf/
GREATPENALLEAPcor.pdf.
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voking a sense of national crisis.  This leads to the very real and
frightening possibility that prisoner rights have eroded, not merely
concurrent with the rise of incarceration of non-whites, but be-
cause of it.
CONCLUSION: RETHINKING PRISON LAW
The time has come for the law to acknowledge the racial implica-
tions of the prison system.  Our courts, in particular, must cease to
comply with a system extensively racialized in ways that jeopardize
the fates of individuals and the democratic validity of the U.S. pe-
nal system.  This requires reassertion of the courts’ basic role in
protecting discrete and insular minorities that lack access to the
normal levers of political power.116  As one commentator put it:
“The judicial obligation to enforce the rights of the politically pow-
erless is at the heart of the American political system.”117  Ex-
pressed differently, federal judicial intervention is appropriate
when important constitutional rights are implicated, when the insti-
tution itself has proven resistant to change through more tradi-
tional legislative or executive means, and where the change
requested is “critical to the quality of American life.”118  The case
for the exercise of judicial discretion to ensure protection of pris-
116. The term “discrete and insular minorities” was first used by Chief Justice
Stone in his famous footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144,
152 n.4 (1938), to describe those groups that most require judicial protection in order
to access their constitutional rights. See also JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIS-
TRUST:  A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 73-179 (1980); Robert M. Cover, The Ori-
gins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE L.J. 1287 (1982).  The
essential point of footnote four is that courts should protect from unduly or discrimi-
natorily burdensome state action groups that lack viable political power.  The under-
lying rationale for this theory can be summarized as follows:  since a democratic
system of government assumes the participation of the citizenry, it is only logical to
take the necessary steps to make sure that the citizenry can indeed participate.  Thus,
if it is determined that a certain group (i.e., a “discrete and insular minority”) cannot
adequately participate in the political process, then it is up to courts to make sure that
the democratic “majority” does not take advantage of them.  For a compelling argu-
ment that ex-offenders constitute a discrete and insular minority, see generally Ben
Geiger, The Case for Treating Ex-Offenders as a Suspect Class, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1191
(2006). See also generally Dan T. Coenen, Symposium Article: The Future of Footnote
Four, 41 GA. L. REV. 797 (2007); Felix Gilman, The Famous Footnote Four:  A History
of the Carolene Products Footnote, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 163 (2004); Sharona Hoffman,
Corrective Justice and Title I of the ADA, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1213 (2003); Lewis F.
Powell, Jr., Carolene Products Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1087 (1982).
117. See ELY, supra note 116, at 135-36; see also Luther M. Swygert, In Defense of R
Judicial Activism, 16 VAL. U. L. REV. 439, 443 (1982).
118. Donald Zeigler, Federal Court Reform of State Criminal Justice Systems:  A
Reassessment of the Younger Doctrine from a Modern Perspective, 19 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 31, 39 (1985) (citing cases).
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oners is compelling under any of these formulations.  Specifically,
we advocate the following reforms:
1. Use the Eighth Amendment to protect against conditions and
practices that fall below civilized standards of decency, re-
gardless of the state of mind of the defendant prison official;
2. Overrule the extreme deference standard of Turner v. Safley
so that defendant officials must meaningfully justify prison re-
strictions and conditions that impinge on fundamental rights;
3. Provide meaningful and independent prison oversight;
4. Amend the PLRA to eliminate excessive restrictions on in-
mate access to the courts imposed by that law; and
5. Convene a national commission to (a) examine the negative
impacts of imprisonment and prison conditions on “sending”
communities, and (b) recommend steps to ameliorate those
impacts.119
119. We are grateful to Margaret Winters for this suggestion.
